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Abstract
BACKGROUND: The screening of baggage using X-ray scanners is now routine in
aviation security with automatic threat detection approaches, based on 3D X-ray computed
tomography (CT) images, known as Automatic Threat Recognition (ATR) within the avia-
tion security industry. These current strategies use pre-defined threat material signatures in
contrast to adaptability towards new and emerging threat signatures. To address this issue,
the concept of adaptive automatic threat recognition (AATR) was proposed in previous
work.
OBJECTIVE: In this paper, we present a solution to AATR based on such X-ray CT
baggage scan imagery. This aims to address the issues of rapidly evolving threat signatures
within the screening requirements. Ideally, the detection algorithms deployed within the se-
curity scanners should be readily adaptable to different situations with varying requirements
of threat characteristics (e.g., threat material, physical properties of objects).
METHODS: We tackle this issue using a novel adaptive machine learning methodology
with our solution consisting of a multi-scale 3D CT image segmentation algorithm, a multi-
class support vector machine (SVM) classifier for object material recognition and a strategy
to enable the adaptability of our approach. Experiments are conducted on both open and
sequestered 3D CT baggage image datasets specifically collected for the AATR study.
RESULTS: Our proposed approach performs well on both recognition and adaptation.
Overall our approach can achieve the probability of detection around 90% with a probability
of false alarm below 20%.
CONCLUSIONS: Our AATR shows the capabilities of adapting to varying types of
materials, even the unknown materials which are not available in the training data, adapting
to varying required probability of detection and adapting to varying scales of the threat
object.
Keywords: Adaptive automatic threat recognition, X-ray computed tomography, Image seg-
mentation, Baggage security screening, Automatic threat detection
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Figure 1: Threat objects in 2D X-ray images [2]. Left: threat object signatures of specific
appearance (e.g., firearms) are easy to identify. Right: threat materials are more challenging to
recognize in cluttered X-ray images.
1 Introduction
X-ray computed tomography (CT) scanners have been deployed at airports across the world to
detect threat materials hidden in baggage. By inspecting the content in the 3D reconstructed
image from the scanner, operators are able to identify potential threat objects without the need
for manual search [27, 14]. Some threat objects such as firearms and knives can be recognized
by their appearance, whilst threat (explosive) materials which can be made into threat devices
could have varying physical appearances (e.g., different shapes and volumes, as illustrated for
related work on 2D X-ray in Figure 1) [28, 12, 14]. Current approaches for material based threat
detection, denoted as automatic threat recognition (ATR) or explosive detection systems (EDS)
within the aviation security industry, may use dual energy computed tomography (DECT) [21]
to perform this detection task based on a range of standardised threat material signatures. In
addition, operators may perform a secondary manual inspection of the reconstructed 3D CT
image to resolve materials highlighted by the ATR/EDS process.
Automatic threat recognition (ATR) intends to enable baggage screening more efficient
and effective with only limited human intervention. Attempts have been made in recent works
to address the ATR problem in 2D X-ray images [3, 1, 23, 6, 2] and 3D CT images [11, 40, 9,
22, 28, 27, 26, 7, 20]. Most existing works, however, focus on the recognition of threat objects
having specific shape-based appearances (e.g., firearms, bottles, knives, etc.), which can not be
directly applied to the recognition of threat materials. In this paper, we aim to detect threat
materials in baggage based on 3D CT images. It is usually formulated to be a visual recognition
problem [7] in the X-ray CT imagery domain. A typical approach to addressing this problem
is to use machine learning techniques [27, 7]. Specifically, the potential object volumes are
firstly extracted from the CT images using a 3D segmentation algorithm, then the objects are
classified as threats or non-threats using a binary classifier [7].
One limitation of conventional ATR is the lack of adaptability. Once the ATR models are
deployed to the scanners, they work for the detection of threat materials pre-defined during the
model training. In real scenarios, however, the definition of threat materials evolves with the
changing nature of the international aviation security landscape and the threat actors involved.
As a result, material signatures not originally defined as a threat can emerge as new threat
materials [17]. Although such materials may be detected with current ATR, specific adaptations
are required to improve both sensitivity and specificity of screening. Adapting the deployed ATR
algorithms to these new material signatures is a non-trivial task. First, scanner manufacturers
need to adjust their algorithms to tackle the new definitions which might involve new training
data collection, annotation and algorithm re-training. In addition, it may take considerable
time to have the new algorithm variants certified for deployment [7].
To address this issue, adaptive automatic threat recognition (AATR) is proposed [8, 18, 31]
by the US Department of Homeland Security and the ALERT (Awareness and Localization
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of Explosives-Related Threats) Center of Excellence [4]. The problem AATR aims to address
differs from conventional binary classification problems in that the definition of threats and non-
threats could vary from situation to situation, which raises the requirement for the algorithm to
be adaptive to varying definitions of threat and non-threat material signatures. Conventional
automatic threat recognition aims to classify an object within baggage as a threat or a non-
threat deterministically without the capability of adapting to the change of threat definitions.
However, an adaptive automatic threat recognition algorithm could take the definition of threats
as an additional argument and classify an object as a threat or not accordingly. As a result,
the output of AATR is determined not only by features of the object but also by the definition
of threats. To formulate the AATR problem, ALERT defines a series of adaptability metric
(AM). Each adaptability metric consists of multiple objects requirement specifications (ORS).
For example, the AM of varying materials aims to evaluate how well an AATR algorithm can
adapt to varying materials. Further conceptual details of the AM and ORS defined by ALERT
are described in [8] and related to our work in Section 4.5.
In this paper, we present an approach to resolving the AATR problem originally posed by
[8]. In the initial stage, we propose a multi-scale 3D image segmentation algorithm to segment
objects of different scales and shapes in the baggage. Subsequently, we utilize a multi-class
support vector machine (SVM) [15] to classify the segmented object signatures into different
classes of material. Once the materials of segmented objects are known, our AATR approach
can recognize potential threat objects according to the material signatures specified by the
requirements. Instead of assigning a class label to a given segmented object, we calculate its
probability of belonging to each class. By adaptively manipulating these probabilities, we are
able to make the classification results bias to some specific classes intentionally to satisfy varying
probability of detection requirements.
Contributions of this paper are summarized as follows:
• A novel 3D segmentation algorithm is developed to separate multi-scale material objects
within the CT baggage image so that each segmented object can be further classified as
a threat or non-threat material signature;
• An approach to the AATR problem, as originally posed by [8], is proposed with the
adaptabilities to varying specifications of threat material signatures, varying probability
of detection (PD) requirements and new unseen threat materials for which there are no
examples available during algorithm training;
• An evaluation is conducted to validate the feasibility and effectiveness of the proposed
solution to the AATR problem.
2 Related Work
In recent years, 2D X-ray image based threat object recognition has been extensively studied
[1, 2, 24], although even the use of multiple view X-ray suffers from the challenges of object
recognition under varying orientation and inter-object occlusion. This can be addressed by 3D
X-ray CT imaging which provides abundant information as a 3D volume comprised of successive,
parallel X-ray image slices [14]. 3D X-ray CT imaging can be categorized into single-, dual-
and multi-energy CT based on how many separate energy levels are used for scanning. For the
purpose of material differentiation, it has been shown that dual- and multi-energy CT has an
advantage over single-energy [11, 26]. Since the main focus of this paper lies in the adaptability
of an automatic threat recognition algorithm, we particularly focus on 3D object segmentation
and material classification for automatic threat recognition in 3D baggage CT images. For a
broader view on the background knowledge and techniques of automatic CT image processing
for baggage screening, we refer readers to [35, 38] and [27].
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2.1 CT Image Segmentation
Although CT image segmentation has been extensively studied in literature [22, 16, 27], most
approaches are specially designed for medical CT images of organisms and thus not directly
applicable to our task in which the threat signatures could have varying shapes and materials
[27]. To promote the automatic threat recognition performance in baggage screening, the first
initiative regarding 3D CT image segmentation was proposed via [7, 9]. The initiative resulted
in effective CT image segmentation approaches which can be used for automatic threat recog-
nition [9]. Among the outcomes of this initiative, Grady et al. [13] proposed a 3D CT image
segmentation algorithm featured by a novel Automatic QUality Measure (AQUA) model that
measures the segmentation quality for the segmented object so that good segmentation results
can be achieved by learning segmentation parameters to optimize this measurement based ob-
jective. The model is learned based on 92 “good quality” object segments by a data-driven
machine learning approach. As a result, the effectiveness of the learned AQUA model might
rely on the features (e.g., shape, geometric features) of the training data and is limited when
there exist new objects of arbitrary shapes to segment. Wiley et al.[40] adapted a medical
segmentation technique called Stratovan Tumbler [39] to the baggage CT image segmentation
problem. Kernels of different parameter values are used to deal with the boundaries of objects
having different shapes and sizes. Our segmentation algorithm employs a similar idea that
multi-scale structuring elements (Section 3.1.1) are used to segment objects of different sizes
recursively.
Mouton et al. [26] proposed a novel technique for the 3D segmentation of unknown ob-
jects in the baggage CT images. The proposed algorithm takes advantage of the appearance
information of objects to be segmented (e.g., handguns and bottles) which, however, is not
applicable to our problem since the concerned threat materials could appear in very different
forms. Martin et al. [20] proposed a learning based framework for joint object segmentation and
threat recognition from volumetric CT images. Their work was based on the dual-energy X-ray
computed tomography which can provide more essential information to differentiate materials
[21] while our work focuses on single-energy CT images.
2.2 CT Image Based Material Classification
One key element in automatic threat recognition is materials classification. CT image based
material classification is used to distinguish the candidate signatures of threat materials from
those of non-threat materials. Recently, a new initiative was proposed towards automatic
threat materials recognition based on baggage CT images [7]. Threat materials recognition
in baggage CT images is usually formulated as a material classification problem based on the
segmentation results. Ye et al. [7] proposed a new 3D CT image segmentation approach
followed by classifying the segmented candidate threat material signatures to be threats or
non-threats using multiple SVM classifiers. These classifiers are trained on different clusters
of training object signatures based on their shapes so that the threats and non-threats falling
into different clusters can be recognized using different classifiers respectively. Evaluated on
the particular dataset for this initiative, they achieved 95% probability of detection with a
probability of false alarms less than 10%. Resulting from the same initiative, Zhang et al.[7]
used a pixel classification approach for CT image segmentation which can be implemented by
an expectation-maximization (EM) algorithm and enhanced by using a Markov random field
(MRF) to impose some spatial smoothness-constraints on the iterative two-step EM process.
As for the classification of threats and non-threats, a collective classification algorithm was
employed, where, one SVM classifier was trained for each type of material. Evaluated on the
same data as Ye et al. [7], the performance is slightly worse yet still competitive with 89.2%
probability of detection and 9.7% probability of false alarms. SVM classifier was also employed
for CT image classification by Flitton et al. [12] in which, however, the classification focuses on
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specific objects rather than materials.
The AATR problem to be addressed in this paper aims to improve the adaptability of
conventional ATR algorithms. On one hand, we take advantage of the framework used in many
works that consist of a 3D segmentation algorithm followed by classification. On the other
hand, our proposed segmentation and classification methods make the least use of supervision
information (especially the shapes of objects) to promote the generalization capability. More
importantly, our approach has the adaptability to varying requirements in practical applications.
In parallel to this work, Paglieroni et al. [31] proposed a spatial consensus relaxation method
to determine the most likely material composition for each CT image voxel, followed by threat
signature classification to address the same AATR problem.
3 Method
Our AATR approach consists mainly of three components as shown by the diagram in Figure 2
(i.e. 3D segmentation, material classification and adaptation to varying requirements). These
three components form the pipeline of our approach to threat recognition with the adaptability
to varying requirements (e.g., objects of which properties are required to be recognized as
threats). As the first step, 3D segmentation is used to separate all the object signatures in
baggage based on the raw CT volumetric data. Given a 3D CT image as input, it is firstly
binarised by voxel thresholding and we define these voxels as background. Within this context,
the non-zero voxels are now defined as object volumes. The segmentation algorithm attempts
to find out the 3D volume of each individual object signature which is characterized by a set
of connected voxels of the same material intensity (i.e. voxel value within a CT image) range.
Voxels of each segment are labelled with a unique integer label, while the background voxels
are labelled with zeros. Once segmented objects have been obtained, we need to decide if the
segment object is a threat or non-threat according to the definition of threat objects. Since
the threat objects are defined in terms of their materials and physical properties such as the
density (i.e. defined as the mean intensity of voxels of an object signature), a classification
step is employed to recognize the material types of the segmented objects (i.e. saline, rubber,
clay and others). As a result, any segmented object in the image can be classified as a threat
or non-threat according to its material type derived from the classification result and density
which can be calculated. Due to the inaccuracy of segmentation and classification results, the
detection performance is not perfect with the probability of detection (PD) less than 100%
along with a non-zero probability of false alarm (PFA). To satisfy the particular requirements
in varying practical scenarios, we employ adaptation techniques to trade off the probability of
detection and false alarm. For instance, we take measures to have more segmented objects
classified as threats, which will inevitably mis-classify some non-threats as threats (increasing
the probability of false alarm ) though more true threats are expected to be classified correctly
(increasing probability of detection) at the same time. As a result, the probability of detection
of a specific material can be adaptively increased or decreased to satisfy the requirements. In
our approach, the adaptation can be implemented by manipulating the output probabilities of
different classes (i.e. material types) from a support vector machine (SVM) classifier.
3.1 3D Segmentation
Image segmentation is an important pre-process in many computer vision tasks. By segmenting
objects in images, we are able to focus on the visual information of the individual object without
interference from the background and other objects. Image segmentation has been studied
extensively in recent decades, achieving good performance by learning from a large amount of
training data, using the heterogeneous features of the objects such as color, shape, texture and
semantics. However, the techniques commonly used for image segmentation are not readily
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Figure 2: The framework of our proposed adaptive automatic threat recognition (AATR) ap-
proach.
applicable to the 3D CT images in our problem. First, the CT images are 3D volumetric data
while most state-of-the-art image segmentation algorithms are designed for 2D images. Second,
the objects in the CT images are characterized only by the voxel intensities, lacking of the key
information such as color and texture in the natural images. Finally, the objects concerned in
our problem could have arbitrary shapes without the prior semantic knowledge. Therefore we
propose a novel 3D segmentation algorithm to segment objects of varying materials in 3D CT
images. Our segmentation algorithm consists of two steps: shape based split and intensity based
split. In the shape based split, the algorithm takes advantage of the morphological operations
and the connected-component labelling (CCL) [33] method to split the objects which are not
or slightly touching one another. Subsequently, the intensity based split is employed to handle
the merged objects on which the first step has failed but the merged objects are of different
materials.
3.1.1 Shape Based Split
The basic idea of the shape based split is to use the classical connected-component labelling
(CCL) method to label objects which are not connected. The objects not connected to any
other objects can be directly segmented from others. Objects in baggage, however, are usually
compactly packed, touching each other thus posing a big challenge to the original CCL method.
To address this issue, we apply morphological opening operations to split touching objects.
We first apply erosion to remove the connection voxels among multiple objects, then the CCL
method can be applied to label the individual objects. Finally, the dilation operation is applied
to the segmented individual objects to compensate the voxel loss caused by erosion operations
by using the same structuring element as used for erosion.
One key factor in the morphological opening operation is the selection of the structuring
element (or the kernel). The parameterisation of the structuring element (e.g., the radius of a
sphere) used for erosion determine what kind of connections between two objects can be broken
down. A small-scale structuring element can only split objects connected by a small number
of voxels, while a large-scale structuring element has the risk of completely removing small
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objects. To solve this problem, we use a novel multi-scale morphological opening approach,
using multiple structuring elements of different parameter values recursively. Our multi-scale
morphological opening approach is shown in Figure 3. It can split objects connected by a large
number of voxels without mistakenly removing small objects.
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Figure 3: The proposed shape-based split using multi-scale morphological opening operations.
(a) The morphological opening operation with the structuring element parameter k. (b) Multi-
scale morphological opening work-flow.
Figure 3(a) shows the basic morphological opening operation used in the multi-scale mor-
phological opening approach. The workflow of the multi-scale morphological opening is illus-
trated by the diagram in Figure 3(b). To facilitate our discussion, we describe some notations
and terms used in the following content. A raw image is defined as a three-dimensional CT
image having continuous voxel values. A binary image is defined as a three-dimensional volu-
metric image with binary voxel values (i.e. 0 indicates the background voxels and 1 indicates the
foreground voxels). A label image IL is defined as a three-dimensional volumetric image with
voxel values v ∈ {0, 1, ..., n}, where n is the number of labelled/segmented objects, 0 indicates
the background voxels and the values of i indicates the voxels belonging to the i-th segmented
object. Therefore a binary image is actually a label image with only one labelled object in this
sense.
The morphological opening block takes a label image IL, v ∈ {0, 1, 2, ..., n} as input and
output another label image IL
′
, v′ ∈ {0, 1, 2, ..., n, n+ 1, ..., n+m}, where m ≥ 0. The morpho-
logical opening operation is applied to each object specified in the input label image. Different
from the classical morphological opening with only erosion and dilation operations, we add the
voxel number based pruning process to remove the segmented objects having too few voxels and
use the CCL method to identify segmented objects in the image. For any object oi = {v|v = i}
in the original label image, if it can be further split into more than one objects after the morpho-
logical opening, the voxels of these segmented objects will be relabelled using different values
respectively, otherwise the object will keep unchanged in the output label image. Particularly we
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keep the object unchanged if there is no segmented object left after the morphological opening
operation.
Now we describe the multi-scale morphological opening approach for the shape-based split
in detail. Given a raw image I and its voxel value v ∈ R, our goal is to obtain a label image
IL, v ∈ {0, 1, 2, ..., n}, specifying n segmented objects, and the segmented object oi is specified
by a set of connected voxels whose values are equal to i. First, the raw image I is transformed
to a binary image by voxel-wisely comparing its voxel values with a lower threshold tlower and
an upper threshold tupper which are determined by the prior knowledge, so that the objects
of unconcerned materials can be directly removed. The binary image, which is a special case
of the label image defined above, is then fed into the morphological opening block where the
parameter of the structuring element used for erosion is set as k1. The resultant label image I
L
1
contains n1 segmented objects. Second, we apply the morphological opening block again on the
label image IL1 , v ∈ {0, 1, 2, ..., n1} with a greater structuring element parameter k2 > k1. As a
result, a label image IL2 containing n2 ≥ n1 segmented objects can be obtained. However, there
exists a risk of mistakenly removing small/thin objects by applying the morphological opening
with a relatively large k2. For example, assuming there is an object oi labelled in the label
image IL1 which is merged by two objects, and one of them happens to be small or thin such
that it is completely removed after being split. To avoid this erroneous occurrence, we reinspect
the voxels removed from the label image IL1 to recover the mistakenly removed objects if there
are any. Specifically, we apply an image subtraction operation to get the residual image IR, a
binary image characterizing the background difference between label images IL1 and I
L
2 ,
IR = IL1 − IL2 , vR ∈ {0, 1} (1)
where any voxel value vR in the residual image IR is computed by:
vR =
{
0 if vL1 > 0, v
L
2 > 0 or v
L
1 = v
L
2 = 0,
1 if vL1 > 0, v
L
2 = 0.
(2)
The residual image IR is re-inspected by applying the morphological opening operation with
the same structuring element parameter k1 as that used in the first step. The value of k1
is selected so that none of the threat material signatures can be mistakenly removed by the
erosion operation with such a small structural element. The resultant label image is denoted
as ILR2 , v ∈ {0, 1, ..., nR}, nR ≥ 0. We update the label image IL2 by adding the residual label
image ILR2 :
IL
′
2 = I
L
2 + I
LR
2 , v
L′
2 ∈ {0, 1, 2, ..., n2 + nR}, (3)
where any voxel value vL
′
2 in the label image I
L′
2 is computed by:
vL
′
2 =
{
vL2 if v
LR = 0,
n2 + v
LR
2 otherwise.
(4)
Once the label image IL2 is updated, it can be fed into another morphological opening block
with a greater structuring element parameter k3 > k2 and repeat the steps again to further split
the objects specified in the label image IL
′
2 as shown in Figure 3(b).
Technically, the multi-scale morphological opening operations can be repeated many times
with gradually increased structuring element parameters k. The depth of such recursion is sub-
jective to the scales of objects-of-interest in the CT volumes and the constraint of computation
time. On one hand, more rounds of recursion are needed if the scales of the objects-of-interest
vary significantly for good segmentation performance. On the other hand, more rounds of re-
cursion will require more computation. As a result, the depth of recursion can be decided by
trading-off required segmentation performance against computation. In our experiments, we
recursively apply the morphological operations for three rounds and empirically set k1 = 2,
k2 = 3 and k3 = 8.
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3.1.2 Intensity Based Split
The shape based split method can fail when the merged objects are compactly touching each
other. The intensity based split method provides a complementary way to address this issue
when the merged objects happen to have distinguishable intensity distributions. Objects of
different materials have different intensity distributions as shown in Figure 4. When the merged
objects are of different materials, the voxel intensity will be distributed in multiple ranges
corresponding to the intensity range of each material. Based on this idea, the intensity based
split aims to discover the potential materials in a merged object and assign respective labels to
voxels of the merged object.
A variety of enabling techniques could be used for our purpose of intensity based split.
For example, a probabilistic clustering algorithm using Expectation-Maximization (EM) can be
employed to model the intensity distributions of different materials which are then used to label
each voxel of a given volume as one of the materials [34]. Due to the variations of intensity
distributions for the same material (c.f., Fig. 4), the estimated models using EM might not
generalize well to some specific new volumes. Instead of modelling the intensity distributions
for all materials, we employ a peak-detection method that explores the volume-specific intensity
distribution information and does the segmentation.
Specifically, given a segmented object oi in the label image I
L generated by the shape based
split, we extract the intensity values of all the voxels belonging to this object from the raw image
I. The histogram of the intensity can be computed and gives an intensity distribution curve as
shown in Figure 5. Subsequently, we use a peak detection algorithm to search the number of
objects residing in the segmented object oi and the intensity range for each of them. The peak
detection algorithm uses a sliding window to locate a peak whenever the value in the middle of
the sliding window is the maximum. Once the peaks are detected, we search the lowest value
between two peaks as the intensity boundary of the two objects. If only one peak is detected, it
means there is only one type of material in this segmented object, and we leave it unchanged.
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Figure 5: An illustration of intensity based split.
Otherwise, we assign the voxels whose intensity values are in the same intensity range to a new
object label. As a result, the merged object oi can be split into multiple objects of different
materials. The whole procedure of the intensity based split is illustrated in Figure 5.
3.2 Material Classification
The 3D segmentation algorithm creates a label image IL for each baggage specifying a collection
of object signatures, among which there are both material signatures of interest (threats) and
others (non-threats). The existence of non-threats in the label image will incur false alarms.
To get rid of the false alarms, we need to distinguish the threat signatures from the non-threat
items. In this section, we first describe how the classification is employed in the traditional
ATR and then extend it to the AATR problem.
In the conventional automatic threat recognition problem, the threat materials are pre-
defined and fixed, we only need to annotate the signatures as threats or non-threats by a binary
classifier. The binary classifier can be trained using training data in which all the segmented
objects are annotated as threats or non-threats according to the definition. For example, the
materials of saline, rubber and clay are defined as threat materials in our experiments, we
annotate all the signatures of these three materials in the training data as threats and other
objects as non-threats. To train a classifier for this purpose, we need to extract useful features
from the segmented objects. Based on the definition of threats (i.e. materials of saline, rubber
and clay), we use the normalised histogram of intensities as the feature for classification since
it is able to characterize the material type of an object.
In the adaptive automatic threat recognition problem, it is required to recognize the mate-
rial type of objects so that the detection decision can be made adaptively to varying requirements
of threat material recognition. To this end, we train a four-class classifier, {“saline”, “rubber”,
“clay”, “others”}, where the class “others” denotes a collection of unknown materials other than
the three known materials. Again, we use the normalised histogram of intensities as features
for classification. We use support vector machine (SVM) with a linear kernel as the classifier in
our experiments, though other types of classifiers such as random forest [5] and neural networks
are also applicable.
The SVM classifier is trained using features of ground truth object signatures in the train-
ing data for known material classes (i.e. saline, rubber and clay). For the “others” class,
we synthesize a collection of features as training data belonging to this class. Specifically, a
Gaussian function g(x; a, µ, σ) is used to synthesize a feature vector v:
v = g(x; a, µ, σ) = a · e−(x−µ).
2
σ2 , (5)
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where µ is randomly selected only if it is out of the density ranges of three known materials, σ
is a random number chosen from an empirical range derived from the intensity distribution of
the ground truth material signatures in the training data (see Figure 4).
3.3 Adaptation to Varying Requirements
The adaptation step aims to enable our approach to adapt itself to varying requirements in
practical scenarios. Specifically, we focus on the adaptability metrics defined by [8] in terms of:
(a) varying threat materials; (b) varying probability of detection (PD) requirements.
Given a segmented object, the classification result allows us to know which class it belongs
to. With this information, it is straightforward to classify the segmented objects whose material
types are not included in the requirement specification as non-threats. To enable the adapt-
ability, we also need to know the probability of belonging to each class for a given segmented
object. The probability estimation method for SVM proposed in [41] is used in our experiments.
We trade off the probability of detection and the probability of false alarm by manipulating
the classification results thus adapting our approach to satisfying the requirements of PD/PFA.
Specifically, we adjust the probability of classes pc(oi) for a given segmented object oi as follows:
p′c(oi) = pc(oi) + fc(tPD), c ∈ {saline, rubber, clay, others} (6)
where fc(tPD) is an offset used to adjust the output probability of the classifier for class c, and
tPD is the required probability of detection for a specific material class. Intuitively, when the
offset for class c is positive, the objects will have higher probabilities to be classified as class c.
On the other hand, if the offset is negative, chances are less to classify the objects as this class.
The key issue is how to get the offset functions fc(tPD) for different classes. We repeat
experiments using training data by setting the offset to be varying values and calculate the
corresponding probability of detection. With pairs of probability of detection and offset values,
we can fit the data using smoothing splines [10] to obtain the offset functions fc(tPD). Subse-
quently, these functions can be used to compute the offset values given the required probability
of detection tPD for a specific class.
Other than the manipulation of output probabilities by Eq. (6), we can also trade off the
probability of detection and the probability of false alarm by adjusting the specified density
range. In real scenarios, threat material signatures are defined with additional information of
the density range, i.e., a threat signature of a specific material should have a density within
the pre-defined density range in the requirement specification. The density, Rho, is the mean
intensity over all voxels of an object. Due to the inaccuracy of segmentation and noises in the
raw CT data, the computed densities of segmented objects could have biases. With this regard,
we adjust the density range by a factor α in the following way:
Rho′min = Rhomin ∗ α,Rho′max = Rhomax/α, (7)
where a larger α leads to a smaller density range and thus a lower probability of detection and
a lower probability of false alarm. Since the parameter α in Eq. (7) plays a similar role as the
offset in Eq. (6), we will find and fix the optimal values of α and adjust the offset values in our
experiments to enable the adaptability to varying probability of detection requirements.
4 Experiments and Results
To validate the effectiveness of our proposed approach, we conduct a series of experiments on
real baggage CT image data. In this section, we first describe the CT image data and evalu-
ation metrics used in our experiments. Subsequently, we describe the experiments designed to
evaluate different components (i.e. segmentation, classification and adaptation) of the proposed
approach. Experimental results are presented in each subsection following the description of
experiment settings.
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4.1 Experimental Data
We use data provided by ALERT [8] in all the experiments. The baggage are scanned with a
medical CT scanner Imatron C-300. The image size is 512×512 corresponding to the 475 mm×
475 mm field of view. The slice spacing is 1.5 mm, leading the voxel volume to be (475/512)2 ∗
1.5 = 1.291 mm3. The range of the voxel values is 0 → 32, 767 MHU, where the value of air
is 0, and the value of water is 1024. A public dataset (ALERT TO4 [7]) and a sequestered
dataset (ALERT TO7 [8], unseen) collected by ALERT are employed in our experiments. The
public dataset consists of 188 baggage CT images in which there are 446 object signatures
of three materials (i.e. saline, rubber and clay). These object signatures could be threats or
non-threats according to the definitions of threat in different situations. For example, in one
of our experiments, saline is the only material defined as threat, as a result, all the rubber
and clay signatures will be non-threats. Apart from the material, other physical properties
of the objects such as mass and density are also used to define the threat. The definition of
threat will be clarified in each experiment. The ground truth voxels are labelled by ALERT for
all the objects which could potentially be threats. These ground truth annotations of object
signatures in CT images can be used for the evaluation of our segmentation and classification
algorithms described in Section 3. The sequestered dataset is used for testing the adaptability of
AATR approaches. The CT images in the sequestered dataset consist of not only three known
materials in the public dataset, but also some new materials not seen in the training stage.
Since the sequestered dataset is not openly available to the authors, most of the experiments
presented in this paper are conducted based on the public dataset, though some experimental
results on the sequestered data are also provided with testing on this unseen dataset by the
ALERT team, independent from the authors. We divide the 188 baggage CT images in the
public dataset into two subsets (i.e. the odd set and the even set) by the baggage scanning
serial number. This leads to 94 images in the odd set and 94 images in the even set. We use
one subset for training and test our approach on the other subset. Our use of both a public
and sequestered dataset in this manner directly mimics the unknown nature of the AATR task
under deployment conditions against an unknown threat adversary.
4.2 Evaluation Metrics
We employ the evaluation metrics defined by ALERT [8] in our experiments. Segmentation
performance is evaluated by measuring how many ground truth object signatures in the test
data can be matched with the segmented objects. Here the concept of match is defined by the
precision P and the recall R. Suppose we use G and S to denote the voxel sets of a ground
truth signature and a segmented object respectively, the precision and recall can be obtained
by:
P =
volume(G ∩ S)
volume(S)
, R =
volume(G ∩ S)
volume(G)
. (8)
A ground truth object signature G is thought of as correctly segmented if any segmented object
S achieves P ≥ 0.5 and R ≥ 0.5 for bulks or P ≥ 0.2 and R ≥ 0.2 for sheets.
Once the matching results are obtained for all segmented objects, probability of detection
(PD) and the probability of false alarms (PFA) are employed to evaluate the performance.
Probability of detection is the ratio of the number of detected signatures to the number of
ground truth signatures in all the CT images, whilst probability of false alarm is the ratio of
the number of falsely detected non-threat signatures to the total number of non-threats in the
CT images:
PD =
Ndetections
Nthreats
, PFA =
Nfalse alarms
Nnon−threats
(9)
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Table 1: Segmentation performance of our algorithm and baselines.
Method
PD PFA
saline rubber clay bulk sheet overall overall
baseline 1 (k=2) 0.55 0.69 0.55 0.55 0.71 0.60 0.31
baseline 2 (k=3) 0.60 0.64 0.51 0.59 0.58 0.62 0.30
baseline 3 (k=8) 0.58 0.13 0.12 0.38 0.10 0.29 0.21
baseline 4 (shape-split) 0.80 0.92 0.73 0.78 0.91 0.83 0.49
ours 0.90 0.96 0.97 0.93 0.95 0.94 0.56
4.3 Evaluation of 3D CT Segmentation
To thoroughly evaluate the performance of our proposed segmentation algorithm, we conduct
an ablation study to investigate the contribution of each component (e.g., shape based split,
intensity based split) in the segmentation algorithm. In addition, we also investigate how
different structuring element parameter values affect the segmentation performance. Specifically,
we conduct a comparative experiment by comparing different baseline methods with our full
model. The baseline methods used in our experiment are as follows:
• Baseline 1 uses only the morphological opening (k = 2) with CCL.
• Baseline 2 uses only the morphological opening (k = 3) with CCL.
• Baseline 3 uses only the morphological opening (k = 8) with CCL.
• Baseline 4 uses only the shape based split.
• Our approach uses shape based split followed by intensity based split.
The segmentation performance is evaluated by matching the segmented object signatures
with the ground truth. In this experiment, we define all of 446 saline, rubber and clay objects
as threats regardless of their physical properties. A good segmentation algorithm is expected
to successfully segment all these objects from the 3D CT images, which will lead to a high
probability of detection. Inevitably, the segmentation algorithm will also segment objects other
than the 446 objects of interest, which will contribute to the probability of false alarm. However,
in this stage, we focus more on the probability of detection as an evaluation of segmentation
performance and leave the false alarm issue to the next step of classification. The results of our
approach and different baseline methods are shown in Table 1.
The segmentation performance shown in Table 1 clearly indicates the effectiveness of our
proposed 3D segmentation algorithm. The best overall probability of detection (0.94) is achieved
by our full method. Comparing the performance of our full method with that of different
baseline methods, we know that each component in our method plays an important role in
the segmentation. Baseline methods with only one uniform structuring element parameter
value perform poorly as shown by baseline 1-3 with overall probability of detection as 0.60,
0.62 and 0.29 respectively. Baseline 1 and 2 using a small structuring element (k = 2, 3)
fail to split objects touching each other, while the baseline 3 with a big structuring element
(k = 8) mistakenly removes small threat objects. Finally, a comparison between baseline 4
(0.83 probability of detection) using only shape-based split and our approach (0.94 probability of
detection) using both shape and intensity based splits provides evidence that the intensity based
split is complementary to the shape based split and able to further improve the segmentation
performance.
To give an intuitive insight of how the segmentation works for different cases, we present
some exemplars in Figure 6. The ground truth object signatures, segmented results with some
baseline and segmented results with our approach are shown in the left, middle and right side
of each sub-figure respectively. Each segmented object signature is indicated by one color for
better visualization. Figure 6 (a) presents an example of three merged objects touching each
other, which fails the shape based split when a small structuring element (k = 3) is used, but
can be successfully segmented when using a bigger structuring element (k = 8). This lends
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Figure 6: Exemplar segmentation results. Each sub-figure represents the segmented object
signatures in one slice of the 3D CT image. From left to right are the ground truth object
signatures (only saline, rubber and clay materials are annotated), segmented results with one
of the baselines and segmented results with our approach respectively. Different colours are
used to specify the separated object signatures. (a) The three merged objects cannot be split
using a small structuring element k = 3 (middle) but segmented well when using our multi-
scale segmentation algorithm (right). (b) A half bottle of saline can only be segmented by
the intensity-based split (right). (c) The intensity-based split could cause inaccuracy when the
merged objects have similar voxel intensities (objects 2 and 4 are not well separated even by
our approach).
us evidence that the multi-scale segmentation is effective and necessary. Figure 6 (b) and (c)
illustrate two cases where the intensity based split is helpful. Figure 6 (b) presents an example of
saline in a bottle, for which shape base split successfully segments the bottle whilst the intensity
based split can further identify the saline signature. Figure 6 (c) shows the effectiveness as well
as the limitation of our intensity based split when merged objects have similar intensities. One
can see that the figure on the right side exemplifies the inaccurate segmentation of the object
colourized as yellow and pink.
Overall, our proposed algorithm is able to segment objects of varying scales and shapes.
Using only morphological operations and intensity-based split, our segmentation performance
is comparable with other more complex approaches in [7, 18, 31]. In addition, our segmentation
method is not based on training hence less likely to suffer from overfitting issues than other
learning based methods. It is also noteworthy that a high probability of false alarm is expected
when obtaining a high probability of detection. Therefore a further classification is necessary
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Table 2: A comparison of different classifiers for material classification.
Method kNN (k=3) kNN(k=10) SVM(linear) SVM(RBF) NN
Accuracy 92.9 ± 1.9 90.3 ± 1.6 91.2± 1.4 86.7± 2.2 93.5±1.1
to reduce the false alarms resulted in the segmentation process.
4.4 Evaluation of Material Classification
We first investigate the performance of different classifiers in our material classification task.
Considering the algorithm complexity and the capability of calculating conditional probability,
we choose k Nearest Neighbour (kNN), Neural Networks (NN) and kernel SVM in the com-
parative experiment. We use a radial basis function (RBF) in the kernel SVM method. The
experiment is conducted using both true and synthetic object features, as a result, a multi-class
classification problem with four classes (i.e. saline, rubber, clay and others) is formulated. We
use cross validation and report the mean classification accuracy and standard deviation in Ta-
ble 2. The Neural Network model performs the best, however, the class conditional probability
output by this classifier cannot be adjusted to fulfill our purpose of Eq.(6) since the calculated
class conditional probability is usually very close to either 0 or 1. As for kNN model, it performs
the second best when k = 3 which, however, makes it difficult to calculate the class conditional
probability required by Eq.(6). As a trade-off, we use the linear SVM to classify materials in
our approach.
To evaluate the classification performance for conventional ATR and our adaptive ATR
(AATR) respectively, we design two more experiments. The first experiment aims to evaluate
conventional ATR, in which we assume the threat materials are pre-defined (i.e. all of the 446
saline, rubber and clay objects are threats) and the training data for all types of materials
are available. A binary SVM classifier is trained and used to classify the segmented objects
to be either threats or non-threats. In the second experiment, we use a multi-class classifier
to recognize different types of materials (i.e. saline, rubber, clay and others) where all the
unknown materials are collectively treated as one class “others”. To compare with the binary
classification, the same definition of threats has been used in this experiment, i.e., all of the 446
saline, rubber and clay objects are treated as threat to detect. It is noteworthy that the multi-
class classification results can be directly applied to varying tasks of different threat definitions
(e.g., only one of the three materials is defined as threat), while the binary classification cannot
unless the classifier is re-trained hence limiting its adaptability.
As described in Section 4.1, we divide the public dataset into two subsets and use one
of them for training and the other for testing. During training, we use ground truth voxel
annotations to extract the volumes of objects in the training data, and extract the normalised
histogram features from the object volumes for the classifier training. Again, we use probability
of detection and probability of false alarm as the evaluation metrics for classification perfor-
mance. Good classification will lead to a reduced probability of false alarm without affecting the
probability of detection too much when comparing to those before applying the classification.
The experimental results are shown in Table 3 including the threat detection performance
without classification, with the binary classification and with the multi-class classification. The
use of binary classification significantly reduces the overall probability of false alarm from 0.56
down to 0.29, and keeps high probabilities of detection at the same time. When the multi-class
classification is used, the probabilities of false alarm can be further reduced to 0.24 whilst the
probabilities of detection only decrease slightly. These results validate the effectiveness of our
multi-class classifier which is essential for the adaptability of ATR.
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Table 3: Material classification performance on the public data.
Method Test Set
PD PFA
saline rubber clay bulk sheet overall overall
w/o classification all 0.90 0.96 0.97 0.93 0.95 0.94 0.56
binary classification
odd 0.90 0.99 0.98 0.94 0.99 0.96 0.28
even 0.90 0.93 0.93 0.92 0.91 0.92 0.31
all 0.90 0.96 0.96 0.93 0.95 0.94 0.29
multi-class classification
odd 0.86 0.98 0.98 0.92 0.97 0.94 0.22
even 0.87 0.92 0.93 0.91 0.89 0.91 0.26
all 0.87 0.95 0.96 0.92 0.93 0.92 0.24
Table 4: Results of the adaptation to varying probability of detection requirements.
Threat Definition Required PD Test Set PD PFA
saline
(minMass:137,
Rho:1050-1215)
0.70
odd 0.72 0.08
even 0.72 0.08
all 0.72 0.08
0.80
odd 0.76 0.10
even 0.80 0.11
all 0.78 0.10
0.85
odd 0.81 0.12
even 0.86 0.13
all 0.83 0.12
0.90
odd 0.83 0.16
even 0.87 0.19
all 0.85 0.17
0.95
odd 0.85 0.17
even 0.87 0.21
all 0.86 0.19
4.5 Evaluation of Adaptation
We conduct extensive experiments to evaluate the adaptability of the proposed approach in
terms of adaptability metrics defined by ALERT [8] to simulate varying practical scenarios. All
experiments in this section are carried out by employing the proposed segmentation algorithm
in Section 3.1 followed by the multi-class classification. Again, the performance is evaluated in
terms of probability of detection and probability of false alarm. Apart from the experiment on
unknown materials which is trained on the public dataset and tested on sequestered dataset,
all other experiments in the following sub-sections follow the same training/testing scheme as
before, i.e., training on one subset (odd/even set) and test on the other (even/odd set) of the
public dataset.
4.5.1 Varying Probability of Detection Requirements
An ideal detection algorithm is expected to have 100% probability of detection and 0% prob-
ability of false alarm. Improving the probability of detection usually causes an increase of
probability of false alarm, and reducing the probability of false alarm leads to a lower probabil-
ity of detection.
Firstly, we try to find optimal values of α in Eq. (7) for each known material. To this end,
the values of α are selected from a candidate set of {1.0, 0.9, 0.8, 0.7} exhaustively. Starting
from α = 1, by decreasing the value of α, we may achieve a higher probability of detection and
a higher probability of false alarm. The optimal value of α is selected when the probability of
detection comes to its maximum and an even smaller α will only lead to the increase of false
alarms but no further improvement of detection. In our experiments, we find the optimal α to
be 0.9 for saline and 0.8 for rubber and clay.
Our AATR approach enables the trade-off of probability of detection and probability of
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Figure 7: Probability of detection and probability of false alarm achieved by our approach for
three different materials.
false alarm by manipulating the output probabilities of different threats and non-threats (see
Section 3.3). To learn the relation (i.e. fc(tPD) in Eq.(6)) between probability of detection
and the offset value for each material from training data, we set the offset value in Eq.(6) as
{−0.5,−0.4, ..., 0.4, 0.5} respectively to get the corresponding probabilities of detection, assum-
ing only one type of material is the threat in each experiment. Based on the pairs of probability
of detection and offset values, we can have the offset as a function of the target probability of
detection, i.e., fc(tPD) for each material class c. In the testing phase, the functions are used to
calculate the offset values for the given required probabilities of detection to enable our AATR
adaptive to the requirements. We use odd/even set to learn the functions and test them on the
even/odd set.
Figure 7 shows the relations between probability of detection and probability of false alarm
for each type of material. Our algorithm achieves the highest probability of detection of 85% and
87% on the odd and even set with the probability of false alarm of 18% and 16% respectively,
when saline is the only threat material. The highest probability of detection our algorithm can
achieve for rubber is 93% for both odd and even set with the probability of false alarm of 16%
and 18% respectively. For the clay material, the highest probability of detection of 97% and
91% can be achieved with a very low probability of false alarm of 2% on the odd and even
set respectively. For both saline and rubber, we can see from Figure 7 that the probability of
detection and probability of false alarm gradually change with different offset values in Eq. (6).
The behaviour of clay is quite different in that the change of offset in Eq.(6) does not affect the
probability of detection and probability of false alarm very much. The reason is clay objects
are separated from others with a large margin, thus it is easier for the classifier to make the
decision with high confidence, i.e., the probability is close to one for a positive object and zero
for a negative one. Therefore changing the probabilities slightly does not affect the classification
results very much.
Figure 8 shows the relations between offset values and the probability of detection for
different materials. In each sub-graph, we have pairs of probability of detection and offset
values obtained from the experiments on training data (i.e. odd set in red and even set in blue),
based on which we can infer the offset functions of target probability of detection for different
materials. In our experiments, we use the smoothing spline approach to fit the data points and
get the offset functions. The offset function learned from the odd set will be used for evaluation
experiments on the even set, and vice versa.
To evaluate the adaptability of our approach to varying probability of detection, we set the
target probability of detection for saline as {0.7, 0.8, 0.85, 0.9, 0.95} respectively, and estimate
the offset value for output probability manipulation in Eq.(6) using the learned offset functions.
The experimental results are shown in Table 4. We can see our approach achieves 0.72 and
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Figure 8: The relations between offset and probability of detection for three different materials.
Table 5: Results of the adaptation to varying threat material signatures.
Threat Definition
Test Set
PD PFA
Material minMass Rho range saline rubber clay bulk sheet overall overall
saline
rubber
clay
250
250
250
1000-2000
1000-2000
1000-2000
odd 0.87 0.99 0.98 0.93 0.99 0.95 0.22
even 0.90 0.97 0.94 0.93 0.96 0.94 0.26
all 0.88 0.98 0.96 0.93 0.97 0.94 0.24
saline
rubber
clay
137
180
80
1050-1215
1170-1290
1530-1715
odd 0.86 0.98 0.92 0.90 0.97 0.92 0.21
even 0.87 0.92 0.91 0.91 0.88 0.90 0.25
all 0.87 0.95 0.92 0.90 0.93 0.91 0.23
saline
rubber
137
180
1050-1215
1170-1290
odd 0.86 0.98 - 0.89 0.97 0.92 0.18
even 0.87 0.92 - 0.90 0.89 0.90 0.20
all 0.87 0.95 - 0.95 0.89 0.93 0.19
saline 137 1050-1215
odd 0.83 - - 0.83 1.00 0.83 0.16
even 0.87 - - 0.87 1.00 0.87 0.19
all 0.85 - - 0.85 1.00 0.85 0.17
rubber 180 1170-1290
odd - 0.89 - 100 0.85 0.89 0.11
even - 0.91 - 1.00 0.88 0.91 0.15
all - 0.90 - 1.00 0.86 0.90 0.13
clay 80 1530-1715
odd - - 0.87 0.85 1.00 0.87 0.02
even - - 0.90 0.92 0.80 0.90 0.02
all - - 0.88 0.88 0.89 0.88 0.02
0.78 probability of detection when the requirements are 0.7 and 0.8 respectively. When the
requirement increases to 0.9 and 0.95, our approach achieves 0.85 and 0.86 respectively which
has been the best performance of this approach. In summary, our approach is able to adapt
itself to satisfy varying probability of detection requirements unless the required probability of
detection is beyond the upper performance bound of the approach.
4.5.2 Varying Threat Materials
This experiment aims to evaluate how our approach adapts to varying threat materials. We
simulate this scenario by defining the threats in different ways which are shown in the first
column of Table 5. Each definition specifies the materials that could potentially be threats
as well as the requirements of physical properties (i.e., minimum mass (minMass) and density
(Rho) range) that make an object be a threat for each material. In all cases, the required
probability of detection is set as 0.9 and the learned offset functions are used to estimate the
offset values in Eq.(6). There are totally six different definitions of threats in Table 5 to simulate
six scenarios of threat recognition.
In the first two scenarios, three materials are defined as threats. The differences between
these two scenarios lie in the specified minimum masses (minMass) and density (Rho) ranges.
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The results in Table 5 show that our approach performs well in both scenarios. The performance
for the second scenario is slightly worse than that for the first scenario in terms of probability
of detection (PD). The reason is that smaller objects are required to be detected in the second
scenario, which poses more challenges. On the other hand, the probabilities of false alarm
achieved in the second scenario are reduced due to the additional restrictions of density ranges
in this scenario so that many non-threat signatures can be correctly excluded from the final
detection results.
In the third scenario, two materials of “saline” and “rubber” are defined as threats with the
material of “clay” defined as non-threat. Benefiting from the material classification employed in
our approach, the threat materials can be detected with a comparable probability of detection
to that in the second scenario and the probabilities of false alarm are also significantly reduced
since non-threat object signatures with densities close to that of “clay” can be easily excluded.
Finally, in the last three scenarios only one material is defined as threat. Significant drops
of probability of false alarm can be observed from Table 5 when comparing to that in the
second scenario where all three materials are defined as threats. The probabilities of detection
also decrease by considerable margins. This is due to the overlapping intensity distributions
of different materials and classification errors. For instance, in the second scenario, a true
“saline” signature can still have a chance to be reserved as a positive detection even if it is
misclassified into “rubber” or “saline” since all three materials are defined as threats, in the
last three scenarios, however, it will definitely be mistakenly missed once it is misclassified hence
leading to lower probability of detection.
Overall, the experimental results in Table 5 clearly indicate our proposed AATR approach
has the adaptability to varying material requirements.
4.5.3 Varying Minimum Mass/Thickness
This experiment aims to evaluate how our approach adapts to varying physical properties (i.e.
mass and thickness) of the threats. The proposed multi-scale segmentation algorithm (see
Section 3.1.1) has the capability of detecting objects of varying scales, thus enabling our AATR
adaptive to threats of varying mass/thickness.
To investigate how the approach performs in terms of varying masses in detail, we define
three threat definitions with varying masses. We consider “saline” as the only threat material
and set the mass range as 400 − Inf , 300 − 400 and 100 − 300 as the requirements for being
a threat respectively. The experimental results are shown in Table 6. Our approach is able
to achieve the probability of detection of 0.94 and 0.93 when the threats have masses within
the range of 400− Inf and 300− 400, respectively. Apparently, threats with lower masses are
more difficult to detect, but our approach can still achieve reasonable good performance with a
probability of detection of 0.80 for the threats within the mass range of 100− 300.
A similar investigation is also made on how our approach performs in terms of varying
thickness. In this experiment, we consider “rubber” as the only threat material since there are
a reasonable amount of rubber sheets in the dataset. The thickness ranges of 10− Inf , 6.5− 10
and 0−6.5 are selected as the requirements for being a threat respectively. Experimental results
are shown in Table 7. Our approach is able to achieve the probability of detection of 0.90 and
0.89 when the threats have thickness within the range of 10 − Inf and 6.5 − 10, respectively.
Again, thinner threats within the thickness range of 0−6.5 are more difficult to detect in which
case our approach achieves reasonable well performance with a probability of detection of 0.84.
4.5.4 Unknown Threat Materials
One important requirement of the next generation AATR algorithms for baggage screening is
to improve the detection performance of unknown threat materials which are not seen during
training phase. The proposed approach in this paper has the ability to recognize unknown threat
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Table 6: Results of the adaptation to varying Mass.
Threat Definition
Test Set PD PFA
Material Rho range Mass range
saline 1050-1215 400-Inf
odd 0.85 0.16
even 1.00 0.19
all 0.94 0.17
saline 1050-1215 300-400
odd 0.92 0.16
even 0.94 0.19
all 0.93 0.17
saline 1050-1215 100-300
odd 0.82 0.16
even 0.77 0.19
all 0.80 0.17
Table 7: Results of the adaptation to varying Thickness.
Threat Definition
Test Set PD PFA
Material Rho range Thickness
rubber 1170-1290 10-Inf
odd 0.83 0.11
even 1.00 0.15
all 0.90 0.13
rubber 1170-1290 6.5-10
odd 0.80 0.11
even 1.00 0.15
all 0.89 0.13
rubber 1170-1290 0-6.5
odd 0.76 0.11
even 0.96 0.15
all 0.84 0.13
material signatures due to its unsupervised segmentation and flexible classification algorithms.
In this experiment, we test our algorithms on the sequestered dataset which consists of four
different types of unknown materials named m1, m2, m3 and m4. We train our approach on the
public dataset and test it on sequestered dataset in terms of the detection of unknown material
signatures. The experimental results are shown in Table 8. Our AATR achieves high probability
of detection of 76%, 100%, 92%, 100% for four types of unknown materials with the probability
of false alarm of 12%, 46%, 15% and 11% respectively. It can be seen the performance on
m3 and m4 are better than that on m1 and m2. The probability of detection for m1 is 76%
which is lower than average, probably due to the small scales of those object signatures in the
data. On the other hand, the probability of false alarm for m2 is as high as 0.46 although the
probability of detection is perfect. One reasonable explanation is that many non-threat objects
have overlapped intensity distribution with this material, thus making it difficult to distinguish
between these threat and non-threat signatures.
Table 8: Results of the adaptation to unknown materials.
Threat Definition
PD PFA
Material minMass Rho range
m1 42 380-525 0.76 0.12
m2 67 770-810 1.00 0.46
m3 174 1300-1375 0.92 0.15
m4 183 1350-1430 1.00 0.11
We also compare the performance of our approach with those of [18] and [31] under the
same setting. [18] achieved the probabilities of detection of 27%, 57%, 38% and 55% for m1-m4
respectively [19] which are significantly lower than ours, while [31] achieved the probabilities
of detection of 94%, 84%, 85% and 80% [32] which are lower than ours for three out of four
materials but also with lower probabilities of false alarms than ours. Overall, it is indicated
that our proposed AATR is promising in the adaptability to unknown materials which are not
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available in training data.
5 Discussion
In this section, we discuss the potential issues underlying the proposed approach. One issue
within X-ray CT image segmentation and classification are the metal artefacts caused by metal
material in the baggage [25]. In our experiment, we focus more on the adaptability to varying
requirements than the segmentation performance. Since the data used in our experiments were
captured by a medical CT machine which suffers less from the metal artefacts, there is a risk of
performance drop when the segmentation algorithm is applied to baggage data with significant
artefacts. A potential solution to addressing this issue is to apply the metal artefact reduction
algorithms [30, 29] as a pre-process, though this could be marginal and yet require considerable
additional computation [25].
The proposed approach involves some parameters which are empirically selected based
on the training data, leading to a risk of over-fitting to the data we currently have. In the
segmentation algorithm, there is no training process but some very important parameters whose
values are empirically selected. First, the parameter values of the structuring element used in
the multi-scale morphological opening operation are set as 2, 3 and 8 in our experiments. These
values work under the assumption that all the threat signatures should have volumes bigger than
the smallest-scale structuring element so that they cannot be removed when applying the erosion
operation. If the material of interest has smaller volumes, poorer performance can be expected.
The other parameter in the segmentation algorithm, voxel number threshold, has a similar
effect on the performance. Currently, the value of this parameter is set as 80× 103 empirically,
assuming that any segmented object having less than this volume will be non-threats. The
potential over-fitting issues raised by these parameter values could be partly eliminated with
prior knowledge of the task at hand. For example, if we know, in prior, the minimum volume
of threat materials, proper values of these parameters can be decided.
In the classification algorithm, we need to train a four-class SVM classifier to recognize
the material of a given segmented object. The classification accuracy is important for a low
probability of false alarm by distinguishing non-threats from threats. It is also important for
a high probability of detection by not mistakenly classifying a threat segment to be the non-
threat. Our SVM classifier is trained on the ground truth threat objects in the training data
plus synthesized features for unknown materials based on their density ranges. We use only
the normalised histogram as the features for classification. As we can see from Figure 4, there
are overlapping of features between different materials, hence learning a large margin between
classes would be favourable to fight off the over-fitting issue.
Evaluations in this work are based on a relatively small dataset due to the challenge of
collecting and annotating a large-scale CT baggage dataset. As a proof of concept, the proposed
approach can achieve superior performance compared with other works [7, 18, 31] using the
same dataset. However, more cluttered CT images and more types of threat materials will
be involved in the real-world applications. To address these issues we will consider improving
the 3D segmentation algorithms and employing more powerful material classification methods
within the proposed AATR framework in our future work.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a solution to the adaptive automatic threat (explosive materials)
recognition (AATR) problem. We propose an unsupervised segmentation algorithm for 3D CT
images which works well on objects of different materials. Based on the segmentation results, our
approach is able to adapt to the requirements of varying threat materials, varying probability
21
of detection and the capability of detecting new materials, without the need of re-training on
the labelled data.
In our future work, the classification performance could be improved by using more features
than only the normalised histogram or using dual-/multi-energy CT images. In our current
approach, we have not explicitly handled the CT image noises such as metal artefacts which have
been reported affecting the segmentation [20]. To enhance the adaptability to new materials,
the techniques of zero-shot learning [37] and few-shot learning [36] can also be employed in
future work.
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